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We produce two identical keys using, for the first time, entangled trinary quantum systems
(qutrits) for quantum key distribution. The advantage of qutrits over the normally used binary
quantum systems is an increased coding density and a higher security margin. The qutrits are
encoded into the orbital angular momentum of photons, namely Laguerre-Gaussian modes with az-
imuthal index l +1, 0 and −1, respectively. The orbital angular momentum is controlled with phase
holograms. In an Ekert-type protocol the violation of a three-dimensional Bell inequality verifies
the security of the generated keys. A key is obtained with a qutrit error rate of approximately 10%.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 42.50.Dv, 42.65.Lm
The wish to protect information from unauthorized lis-
teners has driven humans from early mankind on to in-
vent all sorts of cryptographic schemes and encryption
algorithms. The modern computer age has made the
security need as important and the difficulty of break-
ing classical algorithm-based cryptography as easy as
never. In the last decades of the 20th century cryptog-
raphy schemes were proposed where the security relies
on the laws of quantum mechanics [1, 2, 3, 4]. An in-
truder trying to listen in will always be detected. Be-
cause these schemes establish identical secret keys in two
remote locations they have since become known under
the term Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). QKD has
been experimentally performed using all sorts of sys-
tems, applying various protocols, over distances of up
to 120 km [5, 6, 7, 8]. These experiments are performed
in the lab as well as in real-life environments, such as
the nightly sky of a metropolitan city [9, 10, 11]. Even
a secure bank transfer has been performed [12] and com-
mercial prototype systems are already available, which
underlines the need and usefulness of QKD systems.
All experiments performed so far were based on two-
dimensional quantum systems (qubits). Only in recent
years noteworthy research efforts have been put into
higher-dimensional quantum systems (qudits), in partic-
ular multi-dimensional entanglement. Especially their
application in tests of quantum nonlocality and quan-
tum information processing have attracted substantial
interest [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. For quantum cryptog-
raphy the usage of higher-dimensional systems offers ad-
vantages such as an increased level of tolerance to noise
at a given level of security and a higher flux of informa-
tion compared to the qubit cryptography schemes. In
general a QKD protocol is considered secure as long as
the mutual information of the two parties A and B ex-
changing the key is greater than the mutual information
of A and E (or B and E), where E is an eavesdrop-
per. The possible mutual information of an eavesdrop-
per with one of the observers is strictly related to the
noise rate of the protocol and therefore an upper noise
bound for a secure key distribution can be found. For
the BB84 and the Ekert qubit schemes the limit on the
noise ratio is 14.6% [19], which may be slightly improved
with alternative qubit schemes, e.g. using the full set
of d + 1 mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) [20]. In con-
trast, for three-dimensional quantum systems (qutrits)
the noise may be as high as 22.5% [21] for the Ekert
based protocol. Furthermore, because a larger alphabet
is used, each system contains more information than a
two-dimensional one [39]. Here we present QKD using
entangled qutrits in an extended Ekert scheme [4], sim-
ilar to the first QKD experiment with entangled qubits,
performed by Jennewein et al. [22]. The security of the
keys obtained is thereby confirmed by violating a three-
dimensional Bell-type inequality.
In the present work, the qutrits are encoded into the
orbital angular momentum (OAM) of photons in the
Laguerre-Gaussian modes LGp,l, which are the solution
of the paraxial wave equation in its cylindrical coordi-
nate representation. The index p represents the num-
ber of radial nodes and the index l is the winding num-
ber, with 2pil describing the change in phase on a closed
path around the propagation axis. Thus a mode with
p = l = 0 is a Gaussian mode. Throughout this pa-
per we only consider photons with p = 0, which span an
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space.
It has been experimentally shown [23, 24], and was
later theoretically confirmed [25, 26], that in the process
of parametric down-conversion the orbital angular mo-
mentum is conserved for each individual pump photon if
all beams are collinear. Moreover, it has been demon-
strated [23] that the down converted photons are in an
2entangled state with respect to the OAM, which can be
transformed into the maximally entangled state using lo-
cal filtering [27]. Therefore, using a pump beam with a
Gaussian profile one can obtain the maximally entangled
state
ψ = α|0〉|0〉+ β|1〉|2〉+ γ|2〉|1〉, (1)
with α = β = γ = 1√
3
. Here |1〉 is the LG0,1 mode,
|2〉 the LG0,−1 mode and |0〉 the Gaussian mode LG0,0.
Such a maximally entangled state can violate a three-
dimensional Bell-type inequality [28, 29] and therefore
local realism:
S3 =P (A1 = B1) + P (A2 = B1 − 1) + P (A2 = B2)+
+P (A1 = B2)− P (A1 = B1 − 1)− P (A2 = B1)−
−P (A2 = B2 − 1)− P (A1 = B2 + 1) ≤ 2, (2)
with
P (Aa = Bb + k) =
3∑
j=1
P (Aa = j, Bb = (j + k)mod 3)
(3)
being the probabilities that the outcomes of observers A
and B measuring Aa and Bb differ by k (modulo 3). The
observables A1, A2 and B1, B2 correspond to different lo-
cal analyzer settings. Note, that the local realistic bound
for inequality (2) is the same as for the standard CHSH
inequality [30]. The maximal violation for the maximally
entangled state is Smax3 = 4/(6
√
3 − 9) ≈ 2.873. It is
interesting to note that for certain non-maximally entan-
gled states quantum mechanics predicts an even higher
violation, i.e. Snon-max3 = 1 +
√
11/3 ≈ 2.915 [31]. The
violation of (2) has been experimentally shown by Vaziri
et al. [32].
To realize QKD based on an extended three-
dimensional Ekert scheme, the observers A and B ran-
domly switch between three settings of their transfor-
mation holograms. A1, A2 (B1, B2) are the settings to
maximally violate inequality (2) (and therefore check the
security of the protocol) and A3, B3 are settings lead-
ing to perfect correlations and therefore are used for key
production. A and B choose their settings independently
and at random and also record their photon detections in-
dependently. After sufficiently many measurement runs
A and B compare their hologram settings. One-ninth of
the produced data can be used for the key, while 49 of
the data are for the violation of the Bell inequality and
the remaining 49 have to be discarded. After this basis
reconciliation B publicly announces his data for the Bell
inequality check, and A computes the value of S3. In the
case that S3 > 2, the key is secure and an eavesdrop-
per will not have gained any useful information on the
key [40].
In our experimental setup (figure 1) we pump a type-
I 1.5 mm thick β-barium-borate (BBO) crystal with an
Ar+ laser at 351 nm. The optical pump power is ap-
proximately 95 mW and the pump laser is vertically po-
larized. Via spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC) pairs of photons entangled in orbital angular
momentum are produced. To ensure indistinguishabil-
ity, only the energy-degenerate photons are selected via
narrow band filters in fibre-coupled air gaps. The pro-
duced state is almost maximally entangled, with effec-
tive coefficients α = 0.642±0.009, β = 0.546±0.009 and
γ = 0.539±0.009, which are calculated from the observed
coincidence count rates for A3 and B3.
In order to produce and control the LG modes we
use transmission phase holograms — diffraction gratings
which are interference patterns of an LG0,1 mode with a
plane wave [33, 34]. The holograms etched into quartz
glass are 3mm× 3mm, have a periodicity of 30 µm, and
their first-order diffraction efficiency at 702 nm is ap-
proximately 80%. If a beam passes such a hologram, an
LG0,0 is, in the first diffraction order, transformed into an
LG0,1 mode [41]. If the hologram is slightly horizontally
displaced, a superposition of the two modes is obtained,
with the respective amplitudes being a function of the
displacement [23]. By inverting the beam direction the
transformation process of the hologram is also inverted
and an LG0,1 is transformed into an LG0,0. With these
holograms it is possible to create different superpositions
of LG modes necessary for a test of Bell’s inequality and
for our cryptographic scheme [35].
To transform the state of the entangled photons, a pair
of holograms is placed in each down-conversion arm (see
figure 1). These transformations approximate ladder-
operations, i.e. one is a +1 and the other a −1 operation.
Superpositions of the three LG modes (LG0,0, LG0,1 and
LG0,−1) with different relative amplitudes and phases
can be produced by displacing the individual holograms
with step motors. Observers A and B now choose the
right positions of their holograms and can then violate
inequality (2).
For the analysis of the different LG modes the beams
first pass a 2 : 1 and then a 1 : 1 beam splitter, hence
equally splitting them into three parts. Each one of
the resulting beams passes a hologram and is then cou-
pled into a single-mode fibre. Two of the holograms
are aligned such that they transform an LG0,1 (LG0,−1)
mode into an LG0,0 mode. The third hologram is off-
centred, and therefore leaves the modes untransformed.
Since only the LG0,0 has substantial overlap with the fi-
bre mode this arrangement acts as a probabilistic mode
analyser with 13 probability of success. The probabilistic
nature of the analysers is equivalent to a reduced detec-
tion efficiency but otherwise leads to no additional secu-
rity loopholes.
In order to find the optimal settings for the violation
of the Bell inequality each of the analyzer holograms was
displaced by ±1.2 mm from the beam centre in 16 equal
steps. For every one of the 83521 (174) combinations
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FIG. 1: Experimental Setup for the quantum key distribution with qutrits. The source is an Ar+ laser pumping a BBO crystal
at a wavelength of 351 nm and an optical power of approximately 95 mW. Two phase holograms in each down-conversion arm,
mounted on computer controlled step motors, are used for transforming the incoming maximally entangled qutrit state. Proba-
bilistic mode analyzers, consisting of beam splitters, mode selection holograms and single mode fibers, allow the differentiation
between the three orthogonal modes LG0,−1, LG0,0 and LG0,1. The detection signals are then processed in two separate logic
units, where the coincidences are identified via cross-sync signals. Depending on the local measurement result, a value being
either 0, 1 or 2 is passed to the logics first-in first-out buffer (FIFO) and read out by a computer.
of analyser settings all nine coincidences and the single
count rates were integrated over 5 s and written to a file.
The data was finally analysed to check for any violation
of inequality (2). The maximal value we found for S3
was 2.825± 0.052, which is a violation by approximately
16 standard deviations. The respective settings in mil-
limeters from the beam centre were 1.05, 0.75 (hologram
1), 1.2, 0.3 (hologram 2) for A and 0.45, 1.05 (hologram
3), 0.15, 0.0 (hologram 4) for B’s side. The single count
rates were around 19000 s−1 and the coincidences of the
perfect correlations about 250 s−1, with a background of
about 7.4%, i.e. the sum over all coincidence counts in
the unwanted channels. In table I some violations of (2)
and the corresponding hologram positions are shown.
The communication partners A and B had two differ-
ent, completely independent, computers and logics mea-
suring their respective count rates. They only identified
coincidences with the help of synchronisation signals. If
they registered both, the signal from the other side and
a local detection, one entry, 0, 1 or 2 depending on the
result of the local detectors, was stored locally in a com-
puter file (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, the current setting
of the transformation holograms was also written to the
data file. Each measurement lasted 1 s and the step mo-
tors needed about 5 s to align. After many runs the data
were analysed by comparing the bases.
S3 σ H1 [mm] H2 [mm] H3 [mm] H4 [mm]
2.825 0.052 +1.05+0.75
+1.2
+0.3
+0.45
+1.05
+0.15
±0.0
2.723 0.052 −0.15−0.3
−0.3
±0.0
+0.45
+0.9
+0.15
−0.9
2.629 0.056 −0.15−0.6
−0.6
−0.75
−0.15
−1.05
−0.6
−0.6
TABLE I: Experimental data for three exemplary Bell param-
eters S3, which violate the Bell inequality by several standard
deviations. The corresponding settings Aa and Bb, i.e. the
horizontal displacements of the transformation holograms in
mm from the beam centre, are shown — H1, H2 for A’s holo-
grams and H3, H4 for B’s.
The Bell parameter was S3 = 2.688 ± 0.171, which
represents a clear violation of local realism. This ascer-
tained the security of the protocol. We extracted keys
of a length of 150 trits for A and B separately (the keys
are shown in Fig. 2). Out of the 150 trits 14 were errors,
which corresponds to a quantum trit error rate (QTER)
of 9.3%. This demonstrates the successful key distri-
bution, since Bell’s inequality (2) is violated and addi-
tionally the error rate is well below the maximal allowed
noise ratio of 22.5%. Table II shows a possible commu-
nication between A and B using the key generated with
the presented QKD.
We have, for the first time, realised an experimen-
4Original Text T H E R E S U L T I S F O R T Y T W O
Original Code 201 021 011 222 122 011 200 202 102 201 222 022 200 222 012 112 122 201 220 222 201 211 112
Key A 022 001 122 110 002 100 222 201 212 222 122 212 001 221 212 002 201 121 210 212 222 122 222
Cipher
(Code+Key)mod3
220 022 100 002 121 111 122 100 011 120 011 201 201 110 221 111 020 022 100 101 120 000 001
E’s Text Y I J C Q N R J E P E T T M Z N G I J K P A B
Cipher 220 022 100 002 121 111 122 100 011 120 011 201 201 110 221 111 020 022 100 101 120 000 001
Key B 022 001 122 110 002 100 222 201 212 222 122 212 001 221 212 002 201 121 210 212 222 122 222
Decrypted Code
(Cipher-Key)mod3
201 021 011 222 122 011 200 202 102 201 222 022 200 222 012 112 122 201 220 222 201 211 112
Decrypted Text T H E R E S U L T I S F O R T Y T W O
TABLE II: Encryption and decryption of a short message sent between the two partners A and B using the error-corrected key
obtained via the three-dimensional quantum key distribution. Three trits are sufficient to represent each letter of the alphabet
plus the space character. An eavesdropper trying to intercept the message only gets random characters and hence cannot obtain
any information on the original text, whereas observer B uses his key to decypher the original message.
FIG. 2: On the left are the sifted keys obtained by observers A
and B via three-dimensional quantum key distribution. The
bold, coloured numbers are the correct trits while the plain
numbers are errors. From a total key of 150 trits, 136 entries
(90.7%) were the same for A and B. The security of this
key is ascertained by the violation of the Bell inequality (2),
with S3 = 2.688 ± 0.171. On the right are the keys after a
classical error reduction, which is done by checking the parity
of blocks of three trits and throwing away those with different
parities. The final keys are reduced to a length of 72 trits and
are error-free.
tal qutrit QKD. The completely independent parties A
and B produce keys secured by the violation of a three-
dimensional Bell inequality by more than 4 standard de-
viations. The sifted keys had an error rate of approxi-
mately 10%. The effective key rate was rather low due
to the slow motorized base change. This could be im-
proved by implementing the base transformation with
fast devices such as a spatial light modulator or electro
optical switches. In addition, with a biased choice of the
positions of the transformation holograms, the key pro-
duction rate could be further increased. An additional
challenge is the distortion-free transmission of OAM-
encoded photons over large distances. The possibilities
of free-space and fibre links are still under investigation,
since atmospheric turbulences and mode crosstalk in fi-
bres have to be overcome. Gibson et al. already demon-
strated a free-space link of photons with OAM over a
distance of 15 m [36]. Alternatively, encoding higher di-
mensions into other degrees of freedom of photons, such
as time bins [37], or as suggested by Chen et al. [38]
using the four-dimensional entangled states recently re-
alized by [14, 18], might also be considered, as they can
be transported in fibre or free-space over long distances.
For cryptography schemes based on single qutrits, similar
to the BB84 scheme, transformations between MUBs are
required. With our holographic OAM scheme it is cer-
tainly possible to do such transformations and a protocol
of this type is currently under investigation. In contrast
to the polarization degree of freedom, in principle there
is no limitation on the dimension of the two photon en-
tanglement and therefore an extension of the qutrit to a
more general qudit case seems feasible.
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